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Abstract

■ This paper focuses on product regulation, which is one important type of
regulation that influences business firms. We develop a theoretical model that
describes the effect of product regulation on the global competitiveness of
business.

■ Special emphasis is given to the contingency effects of several variables on the
relationship between product regulation and business global competitiveness.
We derive three propositions about these contingency effects, and also discuss
higher-order interactions that may occur between the contingency variables.

Key Results
■ The overall thrust of our argument is to question the universality of the
assumption that regulation is detrimental to business competitiveness.
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The Effect of Product Regulation on
Business Global Competitiveness: A Contingency Approach
As we move rapidly toward the close of the twentieth century, business firms are

becoming increasingly constrained by government regulations. For example,
electric utilities in the United States must comply with the new emission guidelines of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Enholm and Malko
1994). In Germany, stringent solid waste recycling laws make manufacturers
responsible for disposal of their products' packaging even after use by consumers (Sharfman and Ellington 1993). Most recently, U.S. Congressional hear-

ings have highlighted initiatives by the Food and Drug Administration to
regulate tobacco as a drug.
Among the wide range of government regulations affecting business firms,
one important type is product regulation. In this paper, product regulation is
defined as the establishment of standards through formal legislation designed to
protect consumers' health and safety in their physical contact with consumer
products (MacAvoy 1992, OECD 1980, Viscusi 1984). Product safety standards
constitute a legal specification of the consumer's right to expect that consumer
goods placed on the market are safe under conditions of normal use, or reasonably foreseeable misuse (OECD 1987). Examples of product regulation include
the statutes administered by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission,
which include the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Flammable Fabrics Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act,

the Refrigerator Safety Act, and the Fire Safe Cigarette Act. One goal of
product regulation is to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products. This is quite different from the goals of
antitrust regulation, which focuses on market structure and firm conduct within
markets, and regulates phenomena such as entry, exit, merger, and prices (Caves

1982, Wholey and Sanchez 1991).
A common argument among economists and business executives is that
regulations are detrimental to the competitiveness of a business, because of the

costs involved in complying with them (Caves 1982, Guttmann, Sierck, and
Friedland 1992, Kling 1988, Scherer and Ross 1990, Schultze 1977). This paper
challenges the universality of that assumption. We develop a contingency theory
of the effect of domestic product regulation on the global competitiveness of
individual businesses. We first review prior literature regarding the effects of
product regulation on business performance, and then provide an operationalizable definition of business global competitiveness (BGC). Next, we identify
three contingency variables that condition the effect of domestic product regu-

lation on business global competitiveness. These three contingency variables
are: 1) the degree to which a business uses a differentiation strategy (Porter 1980,
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1985); 2) whether global industry demand is declining or growing; and 3)
whether the business' managers perceive regulation as a threat or an opportuni-

ty. Theoretical arguments and propositions are developed that describe the
conditioning effects of each of these variables on the domestic product regulation-BGC relationship. In addition, higher-order interactions between the three
contingency variables are discussed, and the influence of these interactions on
the linkage between domestic product regulation and business global competitiveness is analysed.

This paper makes two contributions to our knowledge of the dynamics
linking regulation and business performance. First, the paper focuses on one of
the most important types of regulation (product regulation) and one of the most
critical dimensions of business performance (global competitiveness). Given the
increasing pace of globalization and the rapid growth of product regulation in

many countries (Levitt 1983, OECD 1980, 1987, Post and Mahon 1980, Ungson, James, and Spicer 1985, Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel 1991), it is essential
that businesses learn how to compete effectively in regulated, world-wide mar-

kets. The theoretical framework developed in this paper, and the empirical
research that will hopefully follow, may provide some guidelines for achieving
that objective.
Second, this paper analyses product regulation from a strategic choice perspective (Child 1972, Miles and Snow 1978), as a factor that provides managers

with choices. By presenting managers with choices, product regulation has
strategic implications for the ability of a business to expand competitive advan-

tage in global markets. The view of regulation as a stimulus for choice is
consistent with past work that has emphasized diversity in the responses of
individual organizations to the same regulatory requirement (e.g., Marcus and
Goodman 1986).

Product Regulation and Business Global Competitiveness
There is a growing body of literature that attempts to determine the relationship
between product regulation and business performance (Leonard 1984, Marcus

and Goodman 1986, MacAvoy 1992, Temin 1979, Thomas 1990, Ungson,
James, and Spicer 1985). Some studies suggest a positive relationship between

product regulation and business performance (Leonard 1984, Thomas 1990,
Wood 1984). But other studies imply a negative relationship (Viscusi 1984,
OECD 1980, Zashin 1982). These inconsistent results are due to problems in
defining and measuring product regulation and business performance, and the
fact that most models pose a simple relationship between product regulation
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and business performance, rather than one that takes account of the contingency effects of contextual variables (Gordon and Miller 1976, Marcus and Good-

man 1986).
One important aspect of business performance that is potentially influenced

by product regulation is business global competitiveness. We expect product
regulation to affect business global competitiveness because of the pervasive
influence product regulation has on the cost structure and attributes of products
sold in global markets. In recent years, a considerable literature has developed

on global competition and global strategy (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991,
Franko 1989, Ghoshal 1987, Hamel and Prahalad 1985, Kogut 1989, Levitt
1983, Porter 1986, 1990). However, this literature rarely provides a definition of
global competitiveness at the level of the individual business or strategic busi-

ness unit (SBU). For the purposes of this paper, we define business global
competitiveness as the ability of a business to establish a sustainable competitive

advantage in a global product or service market (Franko 1989, McKinley,
Munroe, Larson, Melcher, and Chaudhuri 1991). Business global competitiveness is an operationalizable construct, and is therefore falsifiable in the sense
described by Bacharach (1989). As Bacharach (1989) stressed, construct falsifiability is important for stating propositions that can be discontinued, and
therefore for the ability to make conclusive judgements about the validity of
theory. Operational indicators of business global competitiveness include
growth in a business' global sales or share of a global market (Franko 1989,
McKinley et al. 1991).

Differentiation Strategy

Some of the literature reviewed above suggests that product regulation in a
business' home country will be detrimental to the business' global competitiveness, because conforming to product regulations increases costs (Caves 1982,
Kling 1988, Scherer and Ross 1990, Schultze 1977). A central argument of this
paper is that this effect is conditioned by the degree to which a firm uses a
differentiation strategy. Porter (1980, 1985) has described differentiation as one
of several generic strategies that businesses use to gain a sustainable competitive
advantage in product or service markets. The competitive advantage provided
by a differentiation strategy stems from the development of unique, value-enhancing product or service attributes other than low price (Huo and McKinley
1992, Porter 1985).
We argue that the more a business uses a differentiation strategy, the more
positive the effect of domestic product regulation on the business' global competitiveness. There are two reasons for this. First, as Porter (1990) and Leonard

(1984) have pointed out, the regulation of product safety and performance
296
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standards encourages upgrading of product quality and creation of new product
features. Businesses following a differentiation strategy will be able to incorporate these features into their overall strategic posture, and use them to build a
unique image for their product. In other words, a differentiation strategy provides the conceptual framework within which product or process improvements

mandated by product regulation can be translated into increases in global
market share.

Second, the use of a differentiation strategy enhances the ability of a firm to
absorb the short-term costs associated with regulatory compliance. If a differentiation strategy is implemented successfully, enough value is added to a firm's
products to justify a higher price than that demanded by competitors (Porter
1985). Under these conditions, compliance costs due to product regulation will
have a less noticeable effect on market share, and that effect is likely to be

outweighed by the share increases attributable to improved product features.
Examples from Japan and Germany illustrate how product regulation and
a differentiation strategy combine to enhance the global competitive advantage

of businesses. Japan adopted stringent product quality standards for export
goods in the 1950's and 1960's (Porter 1990), and those standards helped Japanese firms pursue successful differentiation strategies in many global industries.
In Germany, the Reinheitsgebot - a 1516 law regulating the purity of beer - is
one of the oldest examples of product regulation known to man. This law is still
used today by German brewers as a basis for differentiating their products from
those of global competitors. The regulatory standards established by the German Institute for Standardization (Porter 1990) have had a similar effect for
many other German businesses pursuing global differentiation strategies. In
many cases (for instance, automobiles), the perceived value and high quality of
the products offered by Japanese or German firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Harrison 1991, Porter 1986, 1990, Wortzel 1989) have justified premium prices,
which have allowed the businesses to recover the costs involved in adhering to
home-country product standards (Porter 1990). In some cases, product features
mandated by product regulation may be incorporated into the differentiation

strategy to increase value and market share. An example would be BMW's
two-seat Zl Roadster, which has plastic external body panels that are labeled
according to resin type, and designed for easy disassembly and collection for
recycling (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 1992).
This argument suggests the following propostion:
Proposition 1: The greater the use of a differentiation strategy, the more positive
the effect of domestic product regulation on business global competitiveness.

Note that in the interaction predicted by Proposition 1, the product regulationBGC relationship can range from negative when a differentiation strategy is not
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used, to positive when a differentiation strategy is the dominant method for
attaining competitive advantage. Note also that the proposition is consistent

with the results of Temin's (1979) study of the influence of food and drug
regulations on the pharmaceutical industry. Food and Drug Administration
regulations resulted in shared patents and competing patents on similar drugs.
Firms that were successful in gaining larger market shares for these drugs were
those that increased their advertising, which is a major indicator of product
differentiation (Temin 1979).

Global Industry Demand
Another variable that may affect the relationship between domestic product

regulation and a business' global competitiveness is the nature of demand
(declining or growing) in the global industry. Harrigan (1980) and Parker and
Helms (1992) have analysed the characteristics of declining industries, and the
different strategies businesses can use to compete in such industries. In general,
declining demand (or movement of the demand curve to the left) in an industry
puts downward pressure on prices (Caves 1982, Samuelson 1976, Stigler 1976).
This reduces a business' ability to recoup the extra costs involved in conforming
to domestic product regulation. If the business raises prices to recover costs
generated by regulation of attributes like product safety, it is likely to lose
market share in an environment of declining demand. In fact, Harrigan (1980)
identified declining industries with substantial reinvestment requirements as
unfavorable competitive environments. A business might be able to differentiate
its product based on features mandated by product regulation, but declining
global demand will put limits on the number of customers who will be willing
to pay the price of such differentiation. This suggests that domestic product
regulation will have a negative influence on a business' global competitiveness
in industries where demand is falling.

On the other hand, in industries where global demand is growing, the
competitive situation is quite different. Growth in demand (or movement of the

demand curve to the right) exerts upward pressure on prices (Caves 1982,
Samuelson 1976, Stigler 1976), and therefore increases the margins available to
businesses to absorb the costs of product regulation. If the product has value to
a growing customer base, the additional costs imposed by regulatory requirements will be viewed as less significant than if demand is declining. Also, in an
environment of growing global demand, businesses can more easily use product
or process upgrades mandated by product regulation as the basis for differentiation strategies. If those strategies are successful, they should have a positive
effect on the business' market share and global competitiveness.
This discussion suggests the following proposition:
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Proposition 2: As global industry demand varies from low growth to high growth,

the effect of domestic product regulation on a business' global
competitiveness becomes more positive.
One example that illustrates the interaction of product regulation and growing
global demand is the poly vinyl chloride (PVC) resin industry (Leonard 1984).
U.S. firms in the global PVC industry have remained highly competitive despite

- or perhaps because of - intense product regulation at home. The case of
acrylonitrile, a high-volume intermediate organic chemical which provides raw
material for industry, is similar to the PVC case. In both instances, a growing

demand for the product, as well as the availability of the right production
technology when it was needed, helped producers absorb the added costs of
regulatory compliance, and retain market share (Leonard, 1984).
Product Regulation: Threat or Opportunity?
As Whetten (1981) has noted, the Chinese word for crisis is composed of two
symbols: danger and opportunity. This suggests a duality in many environmental events that impinge on organizations: on the one hand, they may be construed as dangers or threats, and on the other hand they may be construed as

opportunities. We believe that product regulation is representative of this
duality, because a business' managers can interpret product regulation as either
a threat or an opportunity. Depending on which interpretation is dominant, the
effect of product regulation on the global competitiveness of the business will
vary.

A considerable literature has accumulated regarding the effects of threat and

threat-inducing events on organizations and their members (Bozeman and
Slusher 1979, Cameron 1983, D'Aunno and Sutton 1992, Dunbar and Wasilewski 1985, Jackson and Dutton 1988, Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
The conclusion of much of this literature is that threat produces constricted
domain definition, restricted information processing, and rigidity among individuals in organizations (Bozeman and Slusher 1979, Smart and Vertinsky 1977,
Staw et al. 1981). Thus, if product regulation is interpreted as a threat, managers
may be inhibited by these psychological forces from perceiving innovative responses to regulatory standards. Under conditions of threat, the response to
product regulation is likely to be resistance (Birnbaum 1985), and Marcus and

Goodman (1986) have suggested that resistance to regulation has negative
consequences. For example, an attitude of resistance is unlikely to encourage
strategic initiatives that could be used to expand global market share. In sum-

mary, domestic product regulation is likely to have a negative effect on a
business' global competitiveness if the regulatory mandate is construed as a
threat.
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By contrast, if product regulation is interpreted as an opportunity, we
anticipate a very different dynamic. Viewing a new product standard as an
opportunity sensitizes managers to ways that the standard can be incorporated
into product design or marketing strategies. The result will be unique product
characteristics or marketing campaigns that can be used to capture expanded
positions in global markets. Seeing product regulation as an opportunity can
also help managers anticipate new regulatory standards even before they are

enacted into law. Such anticipation can have positive benefits (Marcus and
Goodman 1986). These include the possibility of developing new, standarddriven technologies and riding the experience curve downward before competitors do. The cost advantages gained by such anticipatory technological development will contribute to a business' global competitiveness. For example, those
American automobile companies that are developing safety features in anticipation of new regulatory standards are likely to be competitive in the global auto
market of the future.

This argument supports a third proposition:
Proposition 3: The less product regulation is perceived as a threat, and the more
it is perceived as an opportunity, the less adverse the effect of
domestic product regulation on business global competitiveness.

This proposition may help explain the results of some previous studies of
regulation. In a study of forest product firms, Sonnenfeld (1982) found a positive relationship between attitudes of tolerance toward regulators and other
stakeholders, on the one hand, and firm effectiveness, on the other. Ungson,

James, and Spicer (1985) found that managers of wood products firms who
perceived their regulators as adversaries also believed that the added costs and
lowered morale attributable to inefficient regulatory enforcement were detrimental to business performance. The proposition above underscores how important perceptions of regulation are to the performance of businesses, especially their global performance.

Global Competitiveness Profiles
The preceding section suggests that a number of factors influence a business'
ability to respond effectively to product regulation, and translate those responses
into global competitive advantage. In the propositions above, we have separated
out the effects of each of the variables that condition the relationship between

domestic product regulation and business global competitiveness. This was
done in order to facilitate future empirical testing of the propositions. However,
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Table 1. Higher-Order Interaction Effects of Firm and Industrial-Level Variables on the Relationship Between Product Regulation and Business Global Competitiveness

Regulation perceived as threat Regulation perceived as opportunity

High

Low

High

Low

differentiation differentiation differentiation differentiation

Declining Adverse effects Mutually Potentially Adverse effects
demand on business reinforcing offsetting effects on BGC
global competi- adverse effects on BGC
tiveness (BGC) on BGC

Growing Potentially Adverse effects Mutually Potentially
demand offsetting effects on BGC reinforcing offsetting effects
on BGC positive effects on BGC
on BGC

in the real world, the contingency variables are likely to influence one another
and combine to create higher-order interaction effects, as portrayed in Table 1
For example, growing industry demand helps foster a belief that product regu

lation can be translated into an opportunity. Furthermore, demand grow

supplies the revenues needed to capitalize on the opportunity, and a differenti
ation strategy provides a cognitive framework that helps transform regulation
driven product modifications into competitive market position. A differentia
tion strategy also makes it less likely that product regulation will be perceiv
as a paralysing threat, further enhancing the probability of a globally compet

itive response to regulation. The profile being described is illustrated in t
lower right-hand, highlighted cell of Table 1 . This profile is similar in complexity

to the "configurations" or "gestalts" discussed by Gordon and Miller (1976
Miller 1987, Miller and Friesen 1984). Such configurations have received i

creased attention from organizational researchers recently (e.g., Meyer, Tsui,

and Hinings 1993, Baker and Cullen 1993).

The businesses least likely to translate domestic product regulation into a
global competitive advantage will be those that do not use a differentiatio
strategy, and have a top management team that views product regulation as

threat. In addition, the effects of these variables, which are themselves mutual

reinforcing, will be compounded if the business is operating in an industry whe
demand is declining. Decline encourages the use of efficiency criteria (Bozem
and Slusher 1979, Cameron 1983), and those criteria are inconsistent with the

implementation of a differentiation strategy. Furthermore, declining deman

constitutes a threat to a business, and threat perpetuates the emphasis o
efficiency (Staw etal. 1981). The threat brought about by decline will als
encourage the kinds of rigidities described by Staw etal. (1981), and thos
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rigidities will reduce the chances of a globally competitive response to domestic
product regulation. The profile we are outlining in this paragraph is shown in
the upper left-hand, highlighted cell of Table 1 . It is characterized by a complex
array of triple interactions and mutually reinforcing feedback effects that help
make the influence of domestic product regulation on business global competitiveness negative.

Discussion and Conclusion

The ideas presented in this paper suggest that government regulation
compatible with the economic performance of individual businesses
under certain conditions. This perspective can be contrasted with the v
some economists and business executives (Caves 1982, Kling 1988, Scher
Ross 1990, Schultze 1977) who assume that there is a trade-off between
demands for correcting market externalities and effective business perf
Our paper raises the possibility that if product regulation is perceiv
opportunity rather than a threat, and if growing market demand and a d
tiation strategy provide financial and cognitive resources with which to
on the opportunity, domestic product regulation can improve the glob
petitiveness of a business. On the other hand, if these facilitative condi
not present, domestic product regulation is more likely to inhibit the
competitiveness of individual businesses. Future research might explore
this contingency framework applies to the relationship between other
regulation and business performance.
This brings up a second point, which has to do with the issue of man
choice mentioned in the introduction. If our arguments are correct, th

competitiveness of businesses in markets where product characteri
regulated is not completely determined by immutable external for

argued by some economists (see Scherer and Ross 1990). To some exten
competitiveness is a function of the choices managers make in respondi
societal expectations represented by product regulation. Managers may
able to exert control over trends in market demand, but the competitive
they follow and the way they view product regulation are at least partly
lable. This suggests an important role for the strategic management of

regulation, as well as the possibility that such management may ge

significant payoff in improved global competitiveness. Further work
topic would enhance our understanding of effective organizational res
product regulation, and government regulation more generally.
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Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Association for Business and
Society conference, Hilton Head, South Carolina, March, 1994. The authors would like to thank
Joe Cheng, Lars Larson, Jianwen Liao, Arlyn Melcher, Gyewan Moon, Chuck Stubbart, and
two anonymous MIR reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of the paper. Both
authors contributed equally to the paper.
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